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This paper utilizes a Norwegian experiment with exogenous wage changes to study teacher’s 
turnover decisions. Within a completely centralized wage setting system, teachers in schools 
with a high degree of teacher vacancies in the past got a wage premium of about 10 percent 
during the period 1993-94 to 2002-03. The empirical strategy exploits that several schools 
switched status during the empirical period. In a fixed effects framework, the wage premium 
reduces the probability to quit by 6–7 percentage points and increases recruitment by 4–7 
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1. Introduction 
 
Teachers are important for student achievement, but the evidence indicates that both teacher 
relative wages and teachers’ relative ability have fallen the last decades, see Corcoran et al. 
(2004), Lakdawalla (2006), and Bacolod (2007). This paper analyzes how wages influence 
teachers’  mobility decisions  by exploiting wage variation within a  system of completely 
centralized wage setting.  
 
The decision to stay or leave teaching at a particular school is perhaps the most studied aspect 
of the teacher labor market. It is attractive from an econometric point of view because at least 
voluntary quits must be seen as an outcome merely of decisions of individual teachers. In 
addition, it is reasonable to believe that schools for which teachers tend to quit are in general 
unattractive for some reason. Determinants of quit decisions are therefore likely to indicate 
which factors that influence the general attractiveness of schools. 
 
The evidence on how wages affect teachers’ quit decisions is mixed.
1
 
 One particular problem 
with the existing studies is that school district wage levels may respond to teacher behavior. If 
wages is set in a compensating way and the empirical model does not sufficiently condition 
on the relevant amenities, one will estimate a negatively biased effect of the wage on 
teachers’ responses. The estimates will be biased in the other direction if wealthy school 
districts use the wage to attract high-quality teachers. The only previous paper that use a 
policy intervention to investigate teacher quit behavior seems to be Clotfelter et al. (2008). 
They exploit a three-year long bonus program in North Carolina public schools serving low-
income or low-performing students, and find that the bonus significantly reduced the turnover 
rate.  
                                                 
1 Gritz and Theobald (1996), Murnane and Olsen (1990), Stinebrickner (2001), Boyd et al. (2003) and Ransom 
and Sims (2008) find negative effects of wages on the probability that teachers leave teaching, and Mont and 
Rees (1996) find an effect turnover at the school level. However, Eberts (1987) does not find any significant 
effect on attrition rates, Podgursky et al. (2004) find little evidence that teachers leave teaching for higher pay, 
and Scafidi et al. (2007) find small and mainly insignificant effects of teacher wages on teacher transitions. 
Hanushek et al. (2004) find a negative effect of starting teacher salary on the probability that teachers leave the 
school district, but the effect disappears in models with fixed school district effects.   2 
The lack of instruments for wages makes it attractive to utilize specific institutional settings 
and experiments with exogenous wage differences to identify teacher behavior. The present 
paper exploits the wage setting institution for teachers in the Norwegian public-sector primary 
and lower secondary schools. During a period of more than 40 years, Norwegian teacher 
wages were solely decided by central wage bargaining. With one exception, the only sources 
of variation in the wage across teachers have been teaching experience and the amount of 
formal education. The exception from this rule is the experiment utilized in this paper. In 
three out of the 19 counties of the country, teachers in schools with a high degree of teacher 
vacancies in the past got a wage premium of about 10 percent during the period 1993-94 to 
2002-03. Within this institutional setting neither teachers, individual schools, or individual 
school districts could influence the salary, but teachers are expected to react on wage 
differences in the same way as under local wage setting. The relevant region has in general 
recruitment problems and vacant teacher positions, and relies on using non-certified teachers 
in temporary teaching positions. 
 
I estimate both a quit and recruitment model. The recruitment model is motivated by Krueger 
(1988) and Holzer et al. (1991) who estimate how the number of job applicants responds to 
the wage. In the present setting where most schools have some vacant teacher positions, the 
recruitment process is analyzed by relating the probability that a teacher is recently hired to 
the wage and other characteristics. The quit and recruitment equations describe the supply of 
teachers directed toward individual schools, which is estimated directly on school level data 
by Falch (2010). 
 
Systematic factors explaining why some schools have recruitment problems can be hard to 
observe. One attractive feature of the present experiment is that several schools were eligible 
for the wage premium only some years during the empirical period. Then it is possible to 
analyze variation in teacher turnover and wages in a model with fixed school effects capturing 
the major systematic factors important for low supply.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next sections  give a description of institutional 
features relevant for the analysis  and the data. Sections  4 and 5 present the quit and 
recruitment equations, respectively. The results indicate that a wage increase of about 10   3 
percent reduces the probability to quit by 6–7 percentage points and increases recruitment by 
4–7  percentage points,  which  are effects of  20–35  percent.  Some stability analyses are 
presented in Section 6, while Section 7 uses  the estimates to calculate teacher supply 
elasticities at the school level. Section 8 provides some concluding comments.  
 
 
2. The quasi–natural experiment 
 
To identify teacher behavior, the appointment rules of teachers are crucial as discussed in 
Bonesrønning et al. (2005). First, In Norway the teachers are linked to the schools and not to 
the school districts. They are employed by the school district, but the district cannot move the 
teachers to another school without a major downsizing of the school or an explicit approval by 
the particular teacher. Second, if at least one certified teacher is interested in the vacant 
position, a certified teacher will fill the post. According to the school act, a person that is not 
certified as a teacher can only be employed if no certified teacher applies for a vacant teacher 
position,  and noncertified teachers can only be hired for up to one school year. The 
subsequent year, the school has to make the vacant position public again in order to search for 
certified teachers to apply. According to the national regulations, representatives of the 
teacher union must be informed prior to every hiring decision. In this way the union is able to 
closely monitor that the schools act in accordance with the law, which has been one of the 
cornerstones in the teacher trade union policy. Thus, observed teacher shortages in a particular 
year, defined as the share of noncertified teachers, reflects the state of the teacher labor 
market that particular year. 
 
The wage determination of teachers is almost completely centralized with basically a common 
wage schedule at each school in several European countries, for example France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK. In Norway, the wage of an individual teacher was solely determined by 
central wage bargaining up to and including the school year 2000–01.
2
                                                 
2 Some limited local wage flexibility was introduced in 2001, and the wage setting was further decentralized 
from 2004. Centrally decided funds to be used to wage increases for a limited number of teachers became 
available for the school districts in 2001. The funds may have been used to increase the wage in the schools with 
lowest supply. On the other hand, local governments may have pursued a strategic policy in which they did not 
allocate wage increases to schools that could be eligible for extra pay directly from the central government.  
 The wage varied   4 
across teachers only with respect to education level and teaching experience, but with one 
exception. The exception was teachers in schools located in one of the three northernmost 
counties (out of a total of 19 counties) with particular recruitment problems. The eligible 
schools within these counties were selected by a criterion based on previous teacher 
shortages, and the central government paid a wage premium of about 10 percent to the 
certified teachers at these schools. The school districts had no influence on which schools that 
were eligible of a higher wage and the selection had no financial implications for them.  
 
The experiment includes several schools during the period 1993-94  to 2002-03. Three 
different systems to reduce teacher shortages have been in place during the empirical period. 
In 1993-94 to 1995-96, teachers with at least 50 percent of full post in schools with more than 




Because the criterion for a higher wage was previous teacher shortages, it was known well in 
advance of the school year which schools that would be eligible to pay a higher wage. 
A new system was in place in the school years 1996-97 to 1997-98. Now only teachers in 
schools with more than 30 percent teacher shortages in the past school year were eligible for a 
higher wage. Thus, fewer schools had a wage premium in this period. Within the last system, 
continuing to the school year 2002-03, teachers in schools with more than 20 percent teacher 
shortages on average during the four last school years got a wage premium, and the wage 
premium was equal across all included schools. Falch (2010) includes a closer description of 
the system. 
 
Since a wage premium is expected to increase teacher supply, schools with teacher shortages 
marginally above the criterion for paying higher wage are expected to increase the 
employment of teachers such that the school is not eligible for the wage premium the next 
school year. In this case, the teachers at the school in 1993–94 kept their wage premium as 
long as the system was in place, while new teachers at the school did not get the wage 
                                                 
3 For schools with 20–30 percent teacher shortages in the past school year, the rules in 1993-94 to 1995-96 
differed across school districts. In schools located in one of the north-east school districts in the relevant region, 
the teacher wage premium was about 10 percent when the shortages last year exceeded 30 percent but only about 
5 percent with shortages in the range 20 – 30 percent. In school districts located south-west in the relevant 
region, the teacher wage premium was about 10 percent in all eligible school districts.   5 
premium. In such semi–included schools, only quits and not hires are expected to differ from 
other schools. When a new system starts up, and the school is still not eligible to be included 
in the system, none of the teachers receive the wage premium.  
 
Schools at which teachers have received a wage premium at least once will in this paper be 
denoted experimental schools. The experimental schools can be in three different states in a 
particular year; all teachers receive a wage premium (IN-schools),  only the incumbent 
teachers receive a wage premium (SIN-schools), or none of the teachers receive a wage 
premium (NIN-schools). Several schools switched status during the empirical period. One 
system-induced explanation is that the requirement to be an IN-school varies over time. In 
addition, higher wage is expected to increase the supply, and hence, may change the status for 
a school from IN to SIN or NIN. 
 
The classification of schools was done by state representatives in the relevant counties. 
Because the criterion for a higher wage was previous teacher shortages, it has always been 
known in advance whether a school was eligible for the wage premium. From 1998-99 it has 
been explicit in the instructions from the central government that the classification of IN 
schools the next school year should be done before March 1. For new positions made public 
before this date, the school districts have to pay the wage premium without compensation 
from the state.  
 
Since the classification of schools is based on lagged information, there is no direct causal 
effect of current teacher behavior on whether there is a wage premium. However, if a school 
replaces quitting teachers by noncertified teachers, even though there are certified teachers 
interested in the positions, the incumbent teachers may get a wage premium the next year. 
There are several reasons why this is not likely to be a problem in the present case. When I 
collected the data, the state representatives in the counties reported that they did not believe  
that the system was being manipulated. The appointment rules presented above are crucial in 
this regard. In addition, the criterion for the wage premium varies over time and has been 
decided after the registration of teacher shortages. Both the changes in the system in 1995 and 
1997 were decided in December, while the criterion is based on teacher shortages earlier in   6 
the fall. Finally, the last system from 1998 and onwards was harder to manipulate since the 
criteria was based on four year averages. 
 
Anyway, gaming of the system is not expected to influence the estimates of teacher quits in 
the present paper. Quits are individual decisions, and quitting teachers will not gain from a 
wage premium at the schools she leaves.  
 
The wage premium was a fixed amount in nominal terms that changed in 1994 and 1998. 
Thus, the percentage wage premium varied across teachers and across years. The percentage 
wage premium was lowest in 1993-94 at 7.5 percent and highest in 1998-99 at 12.0 percent.  
 
This experiment differs in several important ways from the North Carolina experiment 
exploited by Clotfelter et al. (2008). It lasted for a much longer period (10 vs. 3 years), the 
wage premium was higher (on average 10 vs. 4 percent), all certified teachers were included 
(in contrast to only math, science and special education teachers in North Carolina), and the 
system was well known for the teachers (Clotfelter et al., p. 1355, argue that “the vast 





The experimental schools are compulsory primary and lower secondary public–sector schools 




In the relevant counties, the population is relatively scattered and relatively few workers 
reside in another school district than their working site. 
Individual teacher data with school identifier are provided by Statistics Norway. I use a 
sample consisting of teachers who have been working at an experimental school at least one 
year during the empirical period since the identification of the wage premium is based on 
within-school variation. Since I will estimate models with individual specific effects, the 
                                                 
4 Private schools exist to a very small degree. In 1995, only 0.5 percent of the students in the relevant counties 
were enrolled at private schools.   7 
sample includes all observations of the teachers that have been working at an experimental 
school. However, observations in which teachers work less than 50 percent of a full-time 
equivalent position are excluded because they are not eligible for the wage premium. In the 
merging of teacher and school data, teacher data are missing for two experimental schools 
established towards the end of the sample period, and school data are missing for two other 
schools. 
 
Table 1 shows the number of schools and teachers with a wage premium in the different 
school years. Because some limited local wage flexibility was introduced for the school year 
2001-02, only data up to 2000-01 are included in the analysis. Few schools were eligible of a 
higher wage during the relatively restrictive system in 1996-97 and 1997-98, while about 
three times as many schools were included in the preceding and following years. The change 
in the criteria to be included in the system over time implies that most schools only had a 
wage premium in a short period. Table 2 shows that out of the 161 experimental schools, 
teachers in 20 schools received a wage premium only in one year and 104 schools received a 
wage premium in less than four years. 65 schools were eligible for the wage premium only 
once, but they typically paid a wage premium to incumbent workers (SIN school) in 
additionally one or two years. 
 
For the relevant counties, the average share of teachers in the empirical period who get a wage 
premium is shown in Figure 1. School districts in which teachers have received the wage 
premium are spread all over the region, although the wage premium is most common in the 
northernmost county. 77 percent of the 90 school districts include at least one experimental 
school in the empirical period, while 13 percent have an average share of teachers who got a 
wage premium above 15 percent.  
 
 
4. The quit equation 
 
4.1. Model specification 
A model of turnover behavior is presented in Appendix A. I estimate the linear probability 
quit model    8 
( ) 12 1 + =α +α α +β +β +γ + +ε
i ii
jt j t d jt t jt jt q * V C IN SIN                                                          (1) 
where 
i
jt q  is a dummy variable for whether teacher i at school j leaves the school between the 
school years t and t+1. αj, αt, and αd are school, time, and school district specific effects, 
respectively,  V and C are  school and individual charachteristics, respectively,  γ  is the 
parameter of interest,  and ε is an i.i.d.  error term by assumption. The motivation for the 
extensive set of fixed effects is that they capture characteristics of the choice set of the 
teachers.  The interaction between time and school districts  captures all common yearly 
elements in the teachers’ choice set at the school district level. In addition, in the centralized 
wage setting regime, time fixed effects capture national wage changes.   
 
Mobility costs are expected to vary across individuals. In addition, the valuation of salary and 
non-pecuniary aspects may depend on individual characteristics as indicated by the model 
formulations in Appendix  A.    The empirical model includes a host of individual 
characteristics as family status and age, which are reported in Appendix B. In addition, I 
estimate models with teacher fixed effects. The school characteristic included in the model is 
the number of students. 
 
I will only consider teachers in permanent positions in the quit model in order to focus on the 
teachers’ choices.  I  relate the quit decision to whether the school pay a wage premium 
(IN+SIN school) the next school year, consequently relying on quits at the end of the school 
years 1992-93 to 1999-2000. Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 3. 
The experimental schools are relatively small, but the teacher composition does not differ 
across school types. The average quit rate  is  18.2 percent,  which is higher than for the 
population of teachers in permanent positions in Norwegian primary and lower secondary 
schools reported by Falch and Strøm (2005) and Falch and Rønning (2007). The relatively 
high quit rate in the present sample seems to be partly related to the fact that experimental 
schools at the outset are unpopular among teachers, and partly related to the fact that the 
sample consists of relatively small schools. In addition, in the present sample the quit rate in 
observations of non-experimental schools is high by construction.  Within  experimental 
schools, the quit rate is slightly lower when they pay a wage premium the next school year.  
   9 
Table 4 reports mobility patterns, restricted to observations of experimental schools. The first 
row reflects the quit rates in Table 3. The share of teachers leaving teaching is similar at 
schools with and without wage premium next year. However, teachers at schools without 
wage premium next year move to a larger extent to other schools without wage premium. 
 
Figure 2 presents the density of the change in the average quit rate at the school level when a 
wage premium is introduced and removed. The figure thus takes school specific factors into 
account. The distribution of the change in the quit rate when a wage premium is introduced is 
clearly to the left of the distribution when the wage premium is removed. The mean values are 
-0.04 and 0.09, respectively, indicating an average effect of the wage premium of 0.065.   
 
4.2. Empirical results 
The first column in Table 5 estimates the effect of the wage premium on the probability to 
quit at school using a model including only time and school specific effects. With this simple 
model formulation, the probability to quit is reduced by 4.8 percentage points when the wage 
increases by about 10 percent. The next column includes interactions between time fixed 
effects and school district fixed effects. Then the effect of the wage premium increases to 5.8 
percentage points. Thus, school district specific factors do not seem to be highly correlated 
with the wage premium, even though the sample includes several schools that never pay a 
wage premium. The model also includes the number of students at school. The result indicates 
that the quit rate is lowest when schools are small, but the wage effect is not affected by 
whether school size is included in the model or not.  
 
The model in column (3) in Table 5 includes a range of observable individual characteristics, 
which  does not affect the wage effect. One reason may be that mobility costs are not 
important, another that mobility costs are captured by the fixed effects in the model. 
Appendix Table B1 shows that few of the individual characteristics have a significant effect at 
five percent level.  
 
Individual fixed effects are included in the model in column (4) in Table 5. This specification 
control for all time-invariant characteristics at the individual level and is by such less 
vulnerable to omitted variable biases. On the other hand, since the dependent variable is a   10 
dummy variable, the dependent variable in this within-individual framework only varies for 
individuals that de facto move in the sample period. Thus, the weight on mobile individuals is 




 The effect of the wage premium is larger in this model than in the previous models, 
which indicates that the previous estimates are not biased upwards by excluded individual 
characteristics.  
The wage response estimated is close to Clotfelter et al. (2008). While the effect in column 
(3) in Table 5 implies a quit elasticity of about -3.3, the results in Clotfelter et al. implies a 
quit elasticity of about -4.3.  
 
The literature on labor supply finds that women’s working hours are more responsive to the 
wage  than men’s working hours, see Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) and Pencavel 
(1998). In addition, Pencavel finds that the wage elasticity is highest for married women and 
young women. It is not straightforward to translate these supply elasticities at the market level 
into mobility responsiveness. One could expect that people who respond strongly in terms of 
hours also respond strongly in terms of mobility. The usual interpretation, however, is that 
women are more responsive in terms of hours since an attractive alternative for many is to 
stay at home. But then they are also less geographically mobile, working in the direction of 
less mobility responsiveness. At the firm level, Manning (2003) finds similar elasticities for 
both genders, while Hirsch et al. (2008) find that women’s labor supply is less elastic than 
men’s. 
 
Column (5) in Table 5 allows for heterogeneous effects of the wage premium across teachers’ 
gender, marital status, and parenthood. The latter interaction is included since it is expected 
that people are less geographically mobile when they have school-aged children.
6
                                                 
5 The sample consists of 1810 teachers, for which 289 is observed only in one year. 59 percent of the rest of the 
teachers quit at least once in the sample period. Using the latter sample, the wage effect increases to 0.090 in the 
model specification in column (3) in Table 5. 
 The results 
indicate that women and teachers with children only weakly respond to the wage as expected, 
while the response is largest for married teachers.  
6 I have also estimated models including interaction between the wage premium and age below 30 years. This 
interaction effect was, however, clearly insignificant in both the quit equation (t-value of 0.36) and the 
recruitment equation below (t-value of 0.27).   11 
 
Table 6 presents the marginal effects of the wage premium for different groups. The marginal 
effects are computed from models that are more flexible than the model in column (5) in 
Table 5 in the sense that they allow for different wage responses for married women and 
married men, married people with and without children, etc. The table shows that three of the 
eight groups specified respond strongly and statistically significant at five percent level on the 




  For unmarried men, the wage effect is similar to the average effect, but 
insignificant at five percent level. Overall, there is a distinct difference between female and 
male teachers. In particular among female teachers it seems like the wage effect depends on 
family status.  
 
5. The recruitment equation 
 
5.1. Model specification 
Quit and recruitment decisions are in general not separable. However, analyzing the matching 
process of teachers and schools is complicated by the fact that one only observes actual 
matches and not all potential matches.
8
 
 The present paper seems to be the first to estimate 
recruitment in the same way as the traditional way to estimate quit decisions. That is possible 
in the present case  since  the schools paying a wage premium typically have recruitment 
problems, markedly reducing the potential influence of other actors (schools, school districts, 
etc.) than teachers.  
I relate the probability that a teacher is recently hired to the wage and other characteristics, 
including several fixed effects. The advantage of an individual level approach compared to a 
                                                 
7 These three groups include 39 percent of the sample. The largest group in the classification of Table 7 is 
married women with school-aged children, including 20 percent of the sample. 
8 To estimate a structural model including both quit and matching decisions, one needs information on the 
searching behavior of teachers. Boyd et al. (2003) seems to be the only paper that estimates a matching model 
for the teacher labor market. They model the initial sorting of newly educated teachers to different schools. By 
focusing on the initial matching they reduce the number of potential matches and avoid modeling quit decisions. 
In the present setting the whole labor market for teachers is relevant. Then each individual with a teacher 
certificate, employed at a school or not, is relevant for vacant teacher posts that exist in the national labor 
market.   12 
school level approach is the possibility to more properly control for individual characteristics. 
The recruitment model estimated is 
12 ′′′′ ′ ′ ′ =α +α α +β +β +γ +ε
i ii
jt j t d jt t jt jt r * V C IN ,                               (2) 
with standard errors clustered at the school level. The equation uses the same notation as in 
equation (1), and 
i
jt r  is a dummy variable for whether teacher i at school j is recruited in year 
t. 
 
Truncation is a concern in the recruitment model since some schools do not have excess 
demand. Some schools do not need to recruit noncertified teachers. In this case one cannot 
rule out that there are teachers interested in working at the school without getting a job offer, 
i.e., recruitment is not only determined by individual teacher behavior. If wages have a strong 
effect on teachers’ mobility decision, we would expect the wage premium to be positively 
related to absence of excess demand. In this case, models that do not take truncation into 
account will underestimate the wage effect on the number of applicants. On the other hand, if 
excess demand and the wage premium are conditionally positively correlated, which is likely 
in the present case, the truncation bias will be towards finding no effect.  
 
In the present data, absence of excess demand is the case in only 21 percent of the 
observations of experimental schools, and does not seem to be correlated with the wage 
premium. In the sample used in the analysis below, the correlation coefficient between wage 
premium and absence of excess demand is -0.02. The correlation coefficient for the within-
school variation is 0.03.  Nevertheless, the relevance of the truncation  issue  will be 
investigated in two ways. First, I will estimate models conditional on the share of vacant 
positions in year t–1, defined as the share of noncertified teachers. With many vacant 
positions last year, several new teachers need to be hired before excess demand is eliminated. 
Secondly, I will estimate models restricting the sample to schools with  vacant teacher 
positions. In addition, I will allow the effect of the wage premium to depend on whether the 
teacher had a permanent teacher position in year t–1. Such teachers only move due to 
individual preferences. 
 
The probability that a teacher is recently hired is expected to be related to whether the school 
pays a wage premium the particular year. Consequently, the sample period is 1993-94 to   13 
2000-01. Descriptive statistics is presented in Table 7. The sample used is larger than for the 
analysis of quits because it includes all certified teachers, not only those with permanent 
positions. This is also why the recruitment rate is higher than the quit rate. Table 7 clearly 
shows that the recruitment rate is higher when the experimental schools pay a wage premium 
to newly hired teachers (IN schools) compared to no wage premium (SIN + NIN schools). 
 
Table 8 shows where the new recruits come from. Schools with wage premium have more 
teachers coming from non-teaching activity, which includes novice teachers in their first job. 
They also to a larger extent than schools without wage premium recruit from other schools, 
including schools in other regions and schools with wage premium. Relatively few of the 
newly hired teachers come from schools in the same school district.  
 
Figure 3 presents the density of the change in the average recruitment rate when a wage 
premium is introduced and removed. The distribution when a wage premium is introduced is 
to the right of the distribution when it is removed, as expected. The mean values are 0.03 and 
-0.09, respectively, indicating an average effect of the wage premium of 0.06.   
 
5.2. Empirical results 
The recruitment equation is more sensitive to model specification than the quit equation. The 
first column in Table 9 shows that the within school and year correlation is relatively large. 
When fixed school district effects are included (column 2), the effect of the wage is somewhat 
smaller. In this model formulation the wage premium  increases the probability  of being 
recently hired by 7.5 percentage points, which is significant at one percent level.  
 
Including individual characteristics reduces the effect  to 5.4  percentage points. Thus, in 
contrast to the quit model, individual characteristics are correlated with the wage premium. 
Table B1 shows that the dummy variable for permanent teacher position last school year has, 
as expected, a strong negative effect on the probability of being hired at a new school the 
present school year.
9
                                                 
9 The dummy variable for permanent position last year can also be included in the quit equation if the sample 
period is restricted to start in 1993-94. In this case, however, the effect of the dummy variable is insignificant at 
five percent level as expected because the sample in the quit equation only consists of teachers presently in 
permanent positions. 
 When excluding this variable from the model, the effect of interest   14 
increases to 7.0 percentage points. Column (4) in Table 9 includes individual fixed effects. In 





The last column in Table 9 includes the same interaction as for the quit equation. In contrast 
to the quit equation, the wage response seems to be lowest for married people. Table 10 
presents the marginal effects of the wage premium for the different groups. Even though the 
average wage effect is similar in the quit and recruitment equation, the groups that respond to 
the wage are different. The wage effect on recruitment is significant at five percent level only 
for unmarried teachers without school-aged children.
11
 
 For married teachers, the effect is 
positive but low, and independent of gender and children.  
The models in Table 11 are estimated to give an indication of the importance of truncation 
using the model in column (3) in Table 9 as the starting point. Some schools may have excess 
supply of teachers. Column (1) in Table 11 conditions on the share of vacant teacher positions 
last year, which reduces the effect of the wage premium from 5.4 to 4.2. Column (3) restricts 
the sample to schools with excess demand the present school year and column (5) restricts the 
sample to schools with excess demand both the present and previous school years. The wage 
effects in these models are 0.052 and 0.043, respectively. Overall, the results indicate that 
there is a small positive truncation bias, but the differences are statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 11 also reports results for models where the wage effect is allowed to differ for teachers 
with a permanent teacher position the previous year. These teachers can stay in their previous 
position if they want. If they are observed as newly hired the present school year, they 
certainly prefer the present school over the previous school. I find that they have a lower wage 
response than other teachers, in the range 2.4–3.8 percentage points, which at five percent 
                                                 
10 The sample consists of 2208 teachers, for which 305 is observed only in one year. 68 percent of the rest of the 
teachers are recently hired at least once in the sample period. Teachers with permanent position last year change 
school in 12 percent of the observations and teachers with temporary position last year change school in 29 
percent of the observations. In addition, in 13 percent of the observations the teacher did not have a teacher 
position last year and are by definition recently hired. Reducing the sample to teachers that are hired in the 
sample period, the wage effect increases to 0.088 in the model formulation in column (3) in Table 9. 
11 These two groups, male and female unmarried teachers without school-aged children, consist of 25 percent of 
the sample. The largest group in the classification of Table 10 is unmarried women without school-aged 
children, consisting of 18 percent of the sample.   15 






6. Stability analyses 
 
Even though the wage response depends on individual characteristics, we would expect 
constancy across time and regions to the extent that the composition of the teachers does not 
change. In this section I also test the assumption made so far that the wage responses are static 
in the sense that it is only the present wage that matter for the individual decisions. 
 
Table 12  present results for both the quit and recruitment equations. The first model 
formulation allows for different wage effects the first and the last year of wage premium. If it 
was well known in advance which schools that would pay a wage premium, as intended, the 
wage effect should not be smaller the first year a school was eligibly of the wage premium as 
the consecutive years. For the last year with wage premium, the effect on recruitment should 
be lower when teachers have forward looking behavior. For the quit equation in column (1) in 
Table 12, the wage response is smallest when wage premium is introduced next year (First 
year wage premium) and largest the last time with wage premium next year (Last year wage 
premium), but the differences are not significantly different from the average effect. The wage 
effect seems to be reasonable stable also in the recruitment equation (column 5), although the 
point estimates indicate weakest effect the last year as expected. 
 
Columns (2) and (6) in Table 12 allow for different wage effects in the first systems in place, 
up to 1997-98, compared to the last system. Within the last system the criterion for wage 
premium is based on average teacher shortages during the last four years and not only the past 
school year as in the previous systems. If the recruitment effect is biased due to gaming of the 
system, the effect would be upward biased. Gaming would imply low recruitment of certified 
teachers in cases without wage premium in order to achieve the premium in the future. Thus, 
with gaming, the estimated effect of the first systems is expected to be largest. The estimated 
                                                 
12 When the sample is restricted to teachers in permanent teacher position last year, the estimated wage effect is 
0.044–0.064 for the model specifications in Table 11, and significant at one percent level in all cases.    16 
wage effects on both quits and recruitment are, however, smaller in the first systems than in 
the last system, although the differences are not significant at five percent level. These results 
indicate that gaming of the system is at most a minor issue for the present analysis. 
 
Three counties were included in the system. Column (3) indicates that the quit response was 
lowest in the northernmost county (Finnmark), although the difference to the other countries 
is insignificant. For  recruitment,  column (7) indicates that the effect was lowest in the 
southernmost of the three counties (Nordland). Finally, Table 12 includes a test on whether 
the wage effect depends on school district size with a cutoff on 1000 students in compulsory 
schooling (about 70 percent of the teachers are employed in school districts with less than 
1000 students), which is rejected. 
 
 
7. A labor supply elasticity interpretation 
 
At the establishment level, changes in individuals’ ranking may be seen as a change in labor 
supply  directed towards the establishment.
13
( ) jt jt jt jt jt jt 1 jt jt STRM 1 q N RM − =++ = − ++
  The supply S faced by a school can be 
decomposed into current incumbent teachers T, new hires R, and teachers who want to work 
at the school but who are not offered a post M  
,                                 (3) 
where N is employment and the quit rate q is a flow variable. Krueger (1988) and Holzer et al. 
(1991) estimate the elasticity of job applicants with respect to the wage, which can be seen as 
the wage response of (R + M). It follows from (3) that the short run wage elasticity of labor 
supply can be written 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
jt jt jt jt jt 1
Sw
jt jt 1 jt jt jt jt jt
S R M qN 11
S NS ln w ln w ln w ln w
−
−
  ∂ ∂∂ ∂
  ε= = + −
 ∂ ∂∂ ∂   
.                            (4) 
In estimating the recruitment equation above, I assumed that employment is supply 
constrained, i.e., Mjt = 0. 
 
                                                 
13 There exist few empirical analyses of overall labor supply faced by individual schools, but Currie (1991), 
Bonesrønning et al. (2005), and Falch (2010) are exceptions.   17 
A more convenient expression of the supply elasticity can be derived for the steady state 
where Njt = Njt-1 = Sjt and Mjt = 0. Total separations qjtNjt-1 is equal to the number of recruits 
Rjt. The short-run elasticity is then given by  





ε = − = ε −ε
∂∂ ln ln
,                          (5) 
while in the long run, setting  jt jt 1 SN − =  in equation (3), the elasticity is   
( )
L
Sw Rw qw ε = ε −ε                                                                                                                       (6) 
One approach in the literature is to assume that separations to and recruitment from non-
employment are insensitive to the wage (Manning, 2003, Ransom and Sims, 2008). In this 
case  ε = −ε Rw qw in steady state, and the labor supply elasticity can be calculated based on 
estimates of εqw .
14
 
 Based on the results in the present paper it is possible to empirically 
consider the appropriateness of this assumption.  
The share of recruits r = R/N is the theoretical counterpart to the empirical specification in 
this paper. Given constant employment, which is reasonable in the present context since the 
wage paid by the school district is not affected by existence of wage premium as explained 




N ln w ln w . Thus, according the 




ln w ln w . The estimated wage effects in Tables 5, 9, and 11 are in 
the range -0.058  –  -0.070 for quits and 0.035–0.075 for recruitment. For the main 
specifications in columns (3), the effects are -0.058 and 0.052–0.054, respectively, clearly not 
significantly different. Thus, according to these results, the assumption in the literature that 
ε = −ε Rw qw  seems reasonable. 
 
To calculate the supply elasticity, the size of the wage premium needs to be specified. The 
average wage premium is 9.5 and 9.1  percent in the sample of the quit and recruitment 
equation, respectively. In the following calculations I assume a wage premium of 0.09 log 
points.  
                                                 
14  Manning (2003) shows that if one relax the assumption that separations to and recruitment from non-
employment are insensitive to the wage, the labor supply elasticity can still be calculated without knowledge of 
the recruitment elasticity by estimating the probability that a recruit comes from non-employment. He finds labor   18 
 
Using the same estimated wage effects as above and equation (5),
15
 
 the short run labor supply 
elasticity is equal to 1.0 for the lower estimates and 1.6 for the higher estimates, with 1¼ as 
the “best” estimate. This result is remarkable similar to the findings in Falch (2010). Falch 
(2010) analyzes the same experiment for the period 1995-96 to– 2000-01, using school level 
data on employment, and find a supply elasticity of about 1.4.  
It follows from equations (5) and (6) that the difference between short and long run labor 
supply elasticities depends on the separation or recruitment rates, which are equal in steady 
state. The quit or recruitment rates are, however, different in the two samples used to estimate 
the wage effects in the present paper. This is one reason why one should be cautious in 
calculating long run elasticities in the present case. If one uses average of quit or recruitment 





Causal evidence on wage effects is hard to establish since in general a myriad of factors 
influence observed wages. This paper has exploited a system of centralized determined wage 
differences for teachers in Norway in a fixed effects framework. I find that the effects of a 
wage premium on separations and recruitment are significant and similar, but not massive. 
Interpreted in a labor supply framework, the results imply a labor supply elasticity of about 
1¼ in the short run. 
 
The empirical results are in accordance with simple economic theory, which predicts that in 
steady state the separation and recruitment elasticities with respect to the wage are equal in 
absolute terms. However, I find that the wage effects depend on individual characteristics. 
                                                                                                                                                         
supply elasticity of about unity. Using the same methodology on German data, Hirsch et al. (2008) find labor 
supply elasticity of 2–4. 
15 Using equation (5) instead of equation (4) is not exactly right. There are two reasons why the steady state 
conditions are not exactly fulfilled. First, excess demand is not observed (Sit  ≥  Nit-1) in 21 percent of the 
observations, working in the direction of lower supply elasticity. Second, the number teachers increased slightly 
in the empirical period since the number of students increased, also working in the direction of lower supply 
elasticity. At the national level, the cohort size increased by about 1.5 percent yearly in the empirical period.   19 
Men respond stronger on wage differentials than women, in contrast to the usual finding for 
working hours. For marital status, the effects differ between the decision to leave a school or 
not and the decision to start to work at a specific school or not. Teachers that are married have 
large quit elasticity but low recruitment elasticity. 
 
The estimated elasticities in the present paper are partial since schools and school districts 
cannot influence the wage level. The identification is based on centrally determined wage 
differentials. The general equilibrium effects are smaller in the case of wage spillovers as 
found by Staiger et al. (2010). When frictions are present in the labor market, as this study 
suggests, some wage-setting power lies in the hands of the establishments. The  possible 
exploration of monopsony power in the short run must be balanced against long-run 
considerations when workers can more fully react to wage differentials. 
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 Table 1. The number of schools and teachers with wage premium 
    1993-94  1994-95  1995-96  1996-97  1997-98  1998-99  1999-
2000  2000-01 
IN 
Schools  70  46  34  22  16  63  76  75 
Teachers  405  223  163  66  51  297  362  325 
                   
SIN 
Schools  0  42  63  0  16  0  15  31 
Teachers  0  266  418  0  59  0  92  218 
                   
IN+SIN 
Schools  70  88  97  22  32  63  91  106 
Teachers  405  489  581  66  110  297  454  543 
Note: IN denotes that all certified teachers at the school receive a wage premium and SIN denotes that only the 





Table 2. Years of different states for the experimental schools 
  0 years  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years  6 years  7 years  8 years  Sum 
IN  0  65  35  24  13  12  5  3  4  161 
SIN  59  44  53  3  2  0  0  0  0  161 
NIN  18  10  14  15  12  52  24  16  0  161 
IN + SIN  0  20  30  54  14  16  10  5  12  161 
Note: IN denotes that all certified teachers at the school receive a wage premium, SIN denotes that only the 
incumbent teachers at the school receive a wage premium, and NIN denotes that none of the teachers receive a 
wage premium. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, quit equation. Mean values (standard deviation) 
  Whole sample    Experimental schools 
     
Without wage premium 
next year for incumbent 
teachers (NIN schools) 
Wage premium next year 
for incumbent teachers (IN 
+ SIN schools) 
Quit rate  0.182    0.172  0.157 
Number of students
  102.8 (103.2)    65.1 (49.5)  64.4 (60.5) 
Age  40.9 (10.1)    41.8 (10.2)  41.3 (10.3) 
Women  0.601    0.609  0.602 
Children 6–18 years of age  0.439    0.453  0.432 
Married  0.583    0.616  0.581 
         
Observations  7,867    3,375  2,306 
Number of individuals  1,810    1,201  1,059 
Number of schools  720    141  158 
Note. The sample includes all teachers who have been working in an experimental school during the empirical 
period (1992-93 to 2000-01), but restricted to observations of permanent position and working at least 50 percent 
of full time. Sample period is 1992-93 to 1999-2000. 
 
 
Table 4. Mobility patterns of teachers in permanent position, percent 
  Working at a school with 
wage premium next year 
Working at a school without 
wage premium next year 
Do not quit  84.3  82.8 
Quit out of teaching  7.6  7.3 
Move to a school without wage premium next year in     
       the same school district  1.1  2.3 
       a school district within the relevant counties  0.8  1.3 
       a school district outside the relevant counties  1.0  1.7 
Move to a school with wage premium next year in     
       the same school district  0.3  0.2 
       another school district  0.2  0.1 
     
Observations  2,306  3,375 
Note. Same sample as for experimental schools in Table 3.    24 
Table 5. The quit equation.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 











Wage premium next year interacted with           
   Women  -  -  -  - 
0.048 
(0.023) 
   Married  -  -  -  - 
-0.059 
(0.023) 
   Children 6–18 years of age  -  -  -  - 
0.050 
(0.024) 
           
Logarithm of the number  










           
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE * School district FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual FE  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Standard error of equation  0.3713  0.3674  0.3608  0.3022  0.3605 
Observations  7,867  7,867  7,860  7,860  7,860 
Note. The sample is defined in the note to Table 3. The models are estimated by the linear probability model, 
standard errors that are Huber-White adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the school level are reported 
in parentheses. The individual characteristics included in models (3)–(5) are dummy variables for each age; 
gender;  dummy variables for marital status (unmarried,  married, divorced, and widow/widower); dummy 
variables for children below 6 years of age, children 6–18 years of age, children above 18 years of age, and no 
children; interaction terms between the dummy variables for children and marital  status; interaction terms 
between the dummy variables for children and gender; interaction terms between gender and marital status; 
dummy variable for  whether the teacher is on leave;  dummy variable for reduced working hours;  dummy 
variables for years  of education;  dummy variable for leader position; and  dummy variable for whether the 
teacher works in the same region as born. All coefficients for the model in column (3) are reported in Appendix 
Table B1. 
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Table 6. Heterogeneous wage effects in the quit equation 
  Married    Non-married 
  Children 6–18 years of age    Children 6–18 years of age 
  Yes    No    Yes    No 
Women 
-0.009 
(0.027)    -0.126* 
(0.028)    -0.021 
(0.041)    -0.005 
(0.034) 
               
Men 
-0.094* 
(0.033)    -0.125* 
(0.035)    -0.057 
(0.053)    -0.067 
(0.037) 
Note. The reported heterogeneous effects are calculated based on a modification of the model in column (5) in 
Table 5. The model is extended by interaction terms between Wage premium next year and (i) Women and 
Married, (ii) Women and Children 6–18 years of age (iii) Married and Children 6–18 years of age, and (iv) 
Women, Married, and Children 6–18 years of age. * denotes significance at five percent level 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics, recruitment equation. Mean values (standard deviation) 
  Whole sample    Experimental schools 
      Without wage premium for new 
teachers (SIN+NIN schools) 
Wage premium for new 
teachers (IN schools) 
Recruitment rate  0.269    0.197  0.254 
Number of students
  112.6 (110.5)    68.2 (53.1)  58.7 (57.9) 
Age  39.5 (10.3)    40.8 (10.4)  40.0 (10.7) 
Women  0.612    0.615  0.613 
Children 6–18 years of age  0.399    0.418  0.398 
Married  0.529    0.558  0.522 
         
Observations  10,482    5,088  1,892 
Number of individuals  2,208    1,717  1,202 
Number of schools  953    151  158 
Note. The sample includes all teachers who have been working in an experimental school during the empirical 
period (1992-93 to 2000-01), but restricted to observations of certified teachers working at least 50 percent of 
full time. Sample period is 1993-94 to 2000-01. 
 
 
Table 8. The origin of the teachers, percent 
  Working at a school with 
wage premium 
Working at a school without 
wage premium 
Incumbent  74.6  80.3 
Did not teach last year  17.8  14.7 
Worked at a school without wage premium last year in     
       the same school district  2.6  2.2 
       a school district within the relevant counties  2.6  1.7 
       a school district outside the relevant counties  1.3  1.0 
Worked at a school with wage premium last year in     
       the same school district  0.7  0.1 
       another school district  0.4  0.1 
     
Observations  5,088  1,892 
Note. Same sample as for experimental schools in Table 7.    27 
Table 9. The recruitment equation  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










Wage premium interacted with           
   Women  -  -  -  -  0.007 
(0.019) 
   Married  -  -  -  -  -0.039 
(0.022) 
   Children 6–18 years of age  -  -  -  -  -0.022 
(0.021) 
           
Logarithm of the number  








           
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE * school district FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Standard error of equation  0.4250  0.4118  0.3464  0.3134  0.3463 
Observations  10,482  10,482  10,468  10,468  10,468 
Note. The sample is defined in the note to Table 7. The models are estimated by the linear probability model, 
standard errors that are Huber-White adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the school level are reported in 
parentheses. The individual characteristics included in models (3)–(5) are dummy variables for each age; gender; 
dummy variables for marital status (unmarried, married, divorced, and widow/widower); dummy variables for 
children below 6 years of age, children 6–18 years of age, children above 18 years of age, and no children; 
interaction terms between the dummy variables for children and marital status; interaction terms between the 
dummy variables for children and gender; interaction terms between gender and marital status; dummy variable for 
whether the teacher is on leave; dummy variable for reduced working hours; dummy variables for years of 
education; dummy variable for leader position; dummy variable for whether the teacher works in the same region as 
born; and dummy variable for whether the teacher had a permanent teacher position last year. All coefficients for 
the model in column (3) are reported in Appendix Table B1. 
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Table 10. Heterogeneous wage effects in the recruitment equation 
  Married    Non-married 
  Children 6–18 years of age    Children 6–18 years of age 
  Yes    No    Yes    No 
Women 
 0.033 
(0.026)     0.050 
(0.029)    0.035 
(0.038)    0.101* 
(0.029) 
               
Men 
 0.031 
(0.036)     0.033 
(0.034)     0.080 
(0.066)     0.068* 
(0.031) 
Note. The reported heterogeneous effects are calculated based on a modification of the model in column (5) in 
Table 9. The model is extended by interaction terms between Wage premium and (i) Women and Married, (ii) 
Women and Children 6–18 years of age (iii) Married and Children 6–18 years of age, and (iv) Women, Married, 
and Children 6–18 years of age. * denotes significance at five percent level   29 
Table 11. The recruitment equation, sensitive analyses 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
Sample  All    Teacher vacancies 
present year 
  Teacher vacancies 
present and last year 












Wage premium interacted with                 
   Permanent teacher position last year  -  -0.064 
(0.026) 
  -  -0.052 
(0.033) 
  -  -0.044 
(0.034) 
                 
Logarithm of the number  













Share of vacant teacher  





  -  -    -  - 
                 
Time FE  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Time FE * school district FE  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Individual fixed effects  No  No    No  No    No  No 
Standard error of equation  0,3463  0.3461    0.3360  0.3359    0.3328  0.3328 
Observations  10,468  10,468    7,829  7,829    6,687  6,687 
Note. The sample is defined in the note to Table 7. The models are estimated by the linear probability model, 
standard errors that are Huber-White adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the school level are reported in 
parentheses. The individual characteristics are dummy variables for each age; gender; indicators for marital status 
(married, divorced, and widow/widower); interaction terms between gender and marital status; dummy variables for 
children below age 18, children below age 6, and children above age 18; interaction terms between the dummy 
variables for children and marital status; interaction terms between the dummy variables for children and gender; 
dummy variable for whether the teacher is on leave; dummy variable for reduced working hours; dummy variables 
for years of education; indicator for leader position; indicator for whether the teacher works in the same region as 
born; and indicator for whether the teacher had a permanent teacher position last year. All coefficients for the 
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Table 12. Stability analyses  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Quit equation    Recruitment equation 








  -  -  -  - 








First year wage premium  0.033 
(0.026)  -  -  -    -0.012 
(0.023)  -  -  - 
Last year wage premium  -0.034 
(0.045)  -  -  -    -0.034 
(0.025)  -  -  - 
The wage premium variable 
interacted with                   
   Before school year 
   1998-99  -  0.034 
(0.035)  -  -    -  -0.047 
(0.031)  -  - 
   County of Nordland  -  -  0.005 
(0.049)  -    -  -  -0.067 
(0.035)  - 
   County of Finnmark  -  -  0.047 
(0.047)  -    -  -  -0.027 
(0.034)  - 
   Less than 1000 students  
   in the school district  -  -  -  0.025 
(0.046) 
  -  -  -  -0.027 
(0.033) 
                   
Logarithm of the number  

















                   
Standard error of equation  0.3608  0.3608  0.3609  0.3609    0.3464  0.3463  0.3463  0.3464 
Observations  7,860  7,860  7,860  7,860    10,468  10,468  10,468  10,468 
Note. The model specifications are the same as in columns (3) in Table 5 and Table 9 for the quit and recruitment 
equation, respectively, except as indicated.    31 
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Appendix A. A model of teacher turnover behavior 
 
Let the utility of working depends positively on the wage W and other job characteristics V. 
School characteristics may influence the effort teachers need to provide, and thereby their non-
pecuniary rewards. Then the lifetime utility from time t on for teacher i working at j can be 
written 
( ) ( )
i ii i
jt jt jt jt 1 U u W ,V E U + = +δ ,                                                                                              (A.1) 
where δ is a discount factor, E is the expectational operator, and j is in the choice set J, where J 
includes schools, other employers, and being out of the labor force. The teacher will prefer 
another state if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
ii i ii i i max
jt jt jt 1 kt kt kt 1 jkt kJ u W ,V E U u W ,V E U c ++ ∈ +δ < +δ − ,                                               (A.2) 
where 
i
jkt c  is the cost of individual i working at j to move to k at time t. Teacher i will prefer to 
quit j if she is offered a job in k. Assuming  ( ) ( )
ii
j t1 k t1 EU EU ++ = , i.e., the job today does not 
affect the opportunities in the future in expectational terms, (A.2) can be written 
( ) ( )
ii ii i max
jt jt kt kt jkt kJ u W ,V u W ,V c
∈  <−                                                                                      (A.3) 
 
If Wjt or Vjt increases in a school j, there will be fewer alternatives that yield a higher utility 
level than staying at the school, which decreases the probability of being offered a job preferable 
to staying at school j. For teachers not working at school j, the probability that school j is 
preferable compared to their present position increases. Within this set-up, each factor that 
makes a school more attractive will both reduce the quit propensity of incumbent teachers and 
increase the number of applicants to vacant teacher posts. The probability to quit can be written  
( ) ∉∉ =
i ii i i
jt jt jt k jt k jt jkt q q W ,V ,W ,V ,c ,    0 ∂∂<
ii
jt jt qW ,                               (A.4) 
and the number of new hires can be written  
( ) ∉∉ =
ii i
jt jt jt k jt k jt kjt R R W ,V ,W ,V ,c ,    0 ∂∂>
i
jt jt RW                                        (A.5) 
 
The dynamic framework of Burdett (1978) gives similar conclusions. In a model with 
incomplete information and costly job search, the search intensity depends on the present utility 
level. Burdett shows that higher wages reduce the quit propensity of workers, both because the 
probability of being offered a more attractive job declines and because it is optimal to reduce the 
search intensity. At the same time, a vacant position is more likely to be matched with a worker   34 
preferring this job over the alternatives since fewer will reject a job offer. Thus, a rise in the 
wage will both decrease the quit propensity of existing workers and increase recruitment by 
higher match probability.   35 
Appendix B. Full models 
 
Table B1. Full models 
  Quit equation    Recruitment equation 
  Model in column (3) 
Table 5    Model in column (3) 
Table 7 
  Mean  
[st. dev.] 
Coeff.  




Wage premium next year  0.262  -0.058* 
(0.018)    -  - 
Wage premium   -  -    0.164  0.054* 
(0.015) 
Log(Number of students)  4.16 
[1.03] 
0.069 




Women  0.601   0.002 
(0.042)    0.612  -0.017 
(0.033) 
Married at present  0.583   0.002 
(0.049)    0.530  -0.026 
(0.040) 
Divorced  0.096  -0.018 
(0.065)    0.095   0.074 
(0.059) 
Widow/widower  0.013  0.374* 
(0.186)    0.011  0.129 
(0.144) 
Unmarried  0.308  Ref.    0.364  Ref. 
Women  * Married  0.348  -0.048 
(0.032)    0.323  -0.001 
(0.023) 
Women  * Divorced  0.060  -0.008 
(0.049)    0.062  0.012 
(0.036) 
Women  * Widow/widower  0.010  -0.168 
(0.112)    0.009  0.005 
(0.087) 
Children below 6 years of age  0.257  -0.001 
(0.041)    0.269  -0.019 
(0.037) 
Children 6–18 years of age  0.439  -0.054 
(0.040)    0.400  -0.010 
(0.030) 
Children above 18 years of age  0.375  -0.013 
(0.061)    0.335  0.001 
(0.044) 
No children  0.231  0.0003 
(0.053)    0.270  0.053 
(0.044) 
Women  * Children below 6 years of age  0.148  -0.030 
(0.030)    0.159  0.011 
(0.026) 
Women  * Children 6–18 years of age  0.273  -0.009 
(0.022)    0.253  0.009 
(0.019) 
Women  * Children above 18 years of age  0.230   0.029 
(0.033)    0.214  -0.005 
(0.027) 
Women * No children  0.134  0.009 
(0.048)    0.158  -0.026 
(0.037) 
Married * Children below 6 years of age  0.165  0.056 
(0.039)    0.164  0.047 
(0.033) 
Married * Children 6–18 years of age  0.325  0.036 
(0.043)    0.283  0.002 
(0.030) 
Married * Children above 18 years of age  0.288  -0.0011 
(0.055)    0.251  0.026 
(0.039) 
Married * No children  0.043  -0.051 
(0.053)    0.041  -0.016 
(0.045) 
Divorced * Children below 6 years of age  0.010  0.007 
(0.067)    0.011  0.024 
(0.051) 
Divorced * Children 6–18 years of age  0.045  0.061 
(0.058)    0.044  -0.002 
(0.048) 
Divorced * Children above 18 years of age  0.060  0.007 
(0.072)    0.059  -0.042 
(0.054)   36 
Divorced * No children  0.008  -0.001 
(0.090)    0.009  -0.154 
(0.087) 
Widow/widower * Children below 6 years of 
age  0.0004  0.580 
(0.350)    0.0003  0.209 
(0.216) 
Widow/widower * Children 6–18 years of age  0.005  -0.155* 
(0.078)    0.004  -0.112 
(0.085) 
Widow/widower * Children above 18 years of 
age  0.010  -0.219 
(0.132)    0.009  -0.033 
(0.086) 
Widow/widower * No children  0.001   0.265 
(0.194)    0.001  0.375 
(0.360) 
On leave  0.008  -0.055 
(0.052)    0.009  -0.070* 
(0.028) 
Reduced working hours  0.133  0.031 
(0.016)    0.148  0.011 
(0.012) 
4 years of higher education  
and non-leader position  0.373  0.025 
(0.013)    0.401  0.020 
(0.011) 
5 years of higher education  
and non-leader position  0.173  0.028 
(0.017)    0.175  0.022 
(0.014) 
More than 5 years of higher education and non-
leader position  0.012  -0.024 
(0.046)    0.015  0.011 
(0.029) 
Years of higher education missing and non-
leader position  0.001  0.305* 
(0.155)    0.002  0.115 
(0.098) 
Leader position  0.156  0.004 
(0.015)    0.139  -0.001 
(0.013) 
3 years of higher education and non-leader 
position  0.285  Ref.    0.268  Ref. 
Work in the same region as born  0.353  -0.040* 
(0.012)    0.342  -0.012 
(0.009) 
Born region missing  0.081  0.004 
(0.020)    0.065  -0.003 
(0.015) 
Working in another region than born  0.566  Ref.    0.593  Ref. 
Permanent position last year  -  -    0.699  -0.441* 
(0.015) 
Dummy variables for age  -  Yes    -  Yes 
School fixed effects  -  Yes      Yes 
Time – School district interaction fixed effects  -  Yes      Yes 
           
Standard error of equation    0.3608      0.3464 
Observations  7,860    10,468 
Note. The models are estimated by the linear probability model, standard errors that are Huber-White adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at 5 percent 
level. 